Whither the consumer?

Well, I'm back from my summer hiatus. I know you all missed me.

So, I'm looking at some graphs that my colleague, Fernando Martin, prepared relating to the behavior of the U.S. economy. First, let's take a look at real GDP. Actually, real GDP per capita, with the population defined as those aged 16-64 plus those aged 65+ and counted as part of the labor force (non-retired). The data (1948-2013) is logged and a linear trend is fit through the sub-sample (1955-2007). Here is what you get:



It is rather remarkable how well the linear trend fits the historical data despite the significant demographic changes that have occurred over this sample period. But, there you have it.

Of course, as the great Eugen Slutsky pointed out, the interaction of chance events could generate periodicity where none actually exists, see: The Summation of Random Causes as the Source of Cyclic Processes. In layman's terms: that linear trend you seen drawn through the data above might just be a figment of your imagination. So we should always be careful when interpreting deviations from statistical trend.

Having said that, there is something rather odd about the recent recovery dynamic. In the U.S., the business cycle is mostly about investment spending. Consumer spending (non-durables and services) is relatively stable. And in the typical recovery dynamic, consumption and investment tend to move together (this applies to booms as well).

The following figure plots (detrended) real per capita consumption (non-durables and services) and investment (includes consumer durables). With the onset of the 2008 recession, we see the sharp drop in consumption and the even sharper drop in investment. The decline in both series initially was not unusual--apart from the severity of the shock. What is unusual is the subsequent recovery dynamic: consumption and investment appear to be heading in different directions, relative to their historical trends.


Here's the same data, except with investment decomposed into residential and non-residential investment.


So, residential investment behaves largely like other forms of investment, except that it is considerably more volatile. In particular, the recovery dynamic for residential investment looks like what one might expect, given the large negative shock in that sector. And yet consumer spending continues to fall away from its historical trend, even as residential investment recovers (albeit, slowly).

Can someone point me to a theoretical model that generates this type of consumption-investment dynamic during a recovery?

Household deleveraging surely has to be a big part of the explanation here--see the following diagram (source). [It is curious to  note, however, that consumption seemed below trend even during the mid-2000s boom period--will have to think about that.]


These debt-service ratios are now at or close to their historical lows. Is the consumer now ready for a major comeback?

Selvmotsigende masteroppgave om formueskatt?

En masteroppgave om formueskatten har fått betydelig oppmerksomheti valgkampen. Oppgaven konkluderer med at bedrifter som gir formueskatt har evne til å betale den. Derfor er ikke formueskatten et problem. Det er nokså selvsagt. Formueskatten er tross alt et resultat av formue.

Masteroppgaven er velskrevet og god etter det jeg kan se, og konkluderer med at skatten tapper bedrifter for kapital:
 «Oppsummert viser regresjonsanalysen at det er en positiv sammenheng mellom utdeling av utbytte og størrelsen på formuesskatten. Det viser at formuesskatten har potensial for å tappe bedriften for kapital.»

Mindre egenkapital i bedriften vil redusere bedriftens mulighet til å investere i fremtiden. Mindre investering kan ha uheldige konsekvenser for økonomien generelt.
Så hvordan kommer studentene likevel frem til at formueskatten ikke er skadelig? Jo, de finner at bedrifter som utløser formueskatt har bedre likviditet og mer egenkapital enn andre bedrifter.
Dette er ikke på noen måte overraskende. Eierne betaler formueskatt på egenkapitalen i bedriften. Er egenkapitalen høy, så er det selvfølgelig større sannsynlighet for at eieren betaler formueskatt. En verdifull bedrift er også normalt mer likvid.
Problemet som mange motstandere anfører er imidlertid at skatten tapper bedrifter for kapital, ikke at bedriftene ikke har råd til å betale den. Skatten betales altså, og den betales med bedriftens kapital. Denne mekanismen gjelder for hele utvalget, også de bedriftene som kan dekke skatten med løpende overskudd. De av bedriftene som har overskudd til å betale skatten må altså uansett forsake fremtidige investeringer.
Diskusjonen for eller mot formueskatt er en debatt om fordeling.  Provenymessig har ikke skatten så mye å si, den utgjør omlag 0,8 % av offentlige inntekter. Dersom hovedmålet er å ta de rikeste, så er den likevel ganske effektiv. Det er ikke noe tvil om at det er de rikeste som betaler mest formueskatt.
Oppgaven viser imidlertid at skatten har en kostnad ved at den tapper bedrifter for kapital. Selv om bedrifter ikke går konkurs på grunn av skatten er den ikke nødvendigvis helt uproblematisk.