U-sving for Høyesterett?


Røeggensaken har tatt en ny og uventet vending. Høyesterett har besluttet at saken skal behandles på nytt med forsterket rett. Det betyr at landets høyeste domstol nå kan vurdere å ta en U-sving.

I følge domstolloven forsterkes Høyesterett i saker av «særlig viktighet». Jeg antar at høyesterett selv avgjør hva de mener er viktig, men i loven pekes det spesielt på to forhold som skal vektlegges; spørsmål om nytt rettssyn og lovkonflikt.

Det er vanskelig å se at en avgjørelse i denne saken skulle kunne innebærer konflikt mellom gjeldene lover. Det mest sannsynlige er derfor at Høyesterett åpner for å tilsidesette rettssynet i Lognvikdommen. Det er i så fall oppsiktsvekkende.

Det er liten prinsipiell forskjell mellom disse sakene. Både Røeggen og Lognvik lånefinansierte investeringer i strukturerte produkter. I begge tilfellene skjedde investeringen etter initiativ fra banken, banken gav lån med sikkerhet i investeringen og informasjonen til kunden var dårlig.

Siden sakene er så like, er det vanskelig å se hvordan Høyesterett skal kunne dømme Røeggens bank uten å gå tilbake på den relativt ferske Lognvikdommen. Å snu etter så kort tid vil nødvendigvis sitte veldig langt inne. Lite har forandret seg siden februar, så et nytt rettssyn vil være en innrømmelse av feil. Denne type høyesterettsdom kan neppe omgjøres, så dersom Røeggen vinner frem vil far og sønn Lognvik ha tapt en halv million på en «feil» av landets høyeste domstol. Mye taler altså for at Høyesterett vil stå fast på denne avgjørelsen.

Høyesterett vil imidlertid støte på et problem dersom den ønsker å dømme i tråd med gjeldende rettssyn. Argumentasjonen må da følge Lognvikdommen, antar jeg. Som jeg har skrevet tidligere er denne avgjørelsen meget haltende.

Dommen bygger på det syn at lånet og investeringen må ses på som to helt separate avtaler som ikke har noe med hverandre å gjøre. Det betyr at differansen mellom utlåns- og innskuddsrenten ikke kan ses på som en kostnad, og mye av kritikken mot bankene faller bort.

Problemet er bare at kjøpet aldri ville funnet sted uten lånet, banken tok til og med pant i produktet og en egen blankett for lånefinansiering av strukturerte produkter ble underskrevet. Man skulle derfor tro at banken var klar over lånefinansieringen. I så fall var ikke lån og investering to uavhengige begivenheter.

I realiteten var lånefinansiering av produktene en litt vanskelig måte å kjøpe risikable opsjoner på. I begge sakene var de totale kostnadene om lag 100 % av investeringen. Til sammenligning koster et vanlig indeksfond mindre enn 0,3 %. Før kostnader er forholdet mellom avkastning og risiko for en opsjon i utgangspunktet den samme som for den underliggende indeksen. Idet signaturen traff papiret lå dermed denne investeringen allerede på havbunnen.

Småsparerne hadde imidlertid ikke hatt en sak dersom kostnadene var lett synlige. Belåningen og sammensetningen var en utmerket forkledning. Innskuddet var for eksempel ikke et vanlig innskudd, men et obligasjonslån. Innskuddsrenten var ikke oppgitt og kunne ikke lett beregnes. Normalt mottar en obligasjonsinvestor en risikopremie. At belåningen av disse obligasjonene tvert i mot skjulte en kostnadsbombe var derfor ikke åpenbart. Den totale kostnad etter lånefinansiering burde vært oppgitt før avtalen ble inngått. I så fall ville sannsynligvis ikke produktene vært salgbare og bankene ville tapt inntekter.

De enorme skjulte kostnadene var ikke avhengig av markedssvingningene. Det kan derfor ikke være noen tvil om at dette var dårlige investeringer uansett markedsutvikling.

Shadow Banking

The Arrow-Debreu model provides the foundation for modern macroeconomic theory and the theory of finance. This is probably as it should be. But like most foundations, it is just a place to start. As John Geanakoplos explains here, the AD model is "relentlessly neoclassical." And what this means, among other things, is that the basic AD model offers no explanation for phenomena related to money, liquidity, banking, and corporate finance (just to offer a partial list). 
 
To make sense of phenomena like money, liquidity, and collateral, we need to model the "frictions" that make intertemporal trade difficult. Frictions like private information, limited commitment, and limited communication. Absent such frictions, debtors could spend their promises easily. Creditors would not not have to worry about promises being broken. Such a world is not likely be free of the business cycle. But business cycles would likely be muted (small shocks would not be magnified as much, or propagated throughout the economy to the same extent). 
 
Of course, economists throughout the ages have thought about these sort of frictions. And there is a substantial body of modern macroeconomic theory that attempts to formalize these notions. A heretofore neglected area of research, however, is what economists have come to call the "shadow banking" sector (see here, here and here). Some recent theoretical work can be found here: 

A Model of Shadow Banking, Gennaioli, Shleifer, Vishny
Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability, Meeks, Nelson, Allesandri

The shadow banking sector is still very large--take a look at this recent news story: Shadow Banking Still Thrives. According to Gary Gorton (Shadow Banking Must not be Left in the Shadows) the shadow banking sector needs to be regulated...somehow. It seems like we're still not exactly sure how this should be done or, indeed, if it is even feasible. 
 
What I mean about "feasibility" is the observation that private agents, particularly those in the financial industry, seem to be extremely good at innovating their way around existing bank legislation. Shedding light on one dark place in the room just causes the little critters to find other shadows. Who knows, maybe that's even a good thing. But I haven't really seen any theoretical papers on the subject (please send if you have). 

Here is Ken Rogoff on the subject: Ending the Financial Arms Race. Here is an excerpt:
Legislative complexity is growing exponentially in parallel. In the United States, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was just 37 pages and helped to produce financial stability for the greater part of seven decades. The recent Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is 848 pages, and requires regulatory agencies to produce several hundred additional documents giving even more detailed rules. Combined, the legislation appears on track to run 30,000 pages. 
As Haldane notes, even the celebrated “Volcker rule,” intended to build a better wall between more mundane commercial banking and riskier proprietary bank trading, has been hugely watered down as it grinds through the legislative process. The former Federal Reserve chairman’s simple idea has been co-opted and diluted through hundreds of pages of legalese. 
The problem, at least, is simple: As finance has become more complicated, regulators have tried to keep up by adopting ever more complicated rules. It is an arms race that underfunded government agencies have no chance to win.

Lessons in history

Good news - I'm working on another book!



In the meantime, here's an interesting and forgotten page from the history of JavaScript that I stumbled upon thanks to Tavis. It's a long read, edited a bit for clarity; it's also fascinating account of how close we came to replacing the same-origin policy - its faults notwithstanding - with something much worse than that:



"The security model adopted by Navigator 2.0 and 3.0 is functional, but suffers from a number of problems. The [same-origin policy] that prevents one script from reading the contents of a window from another server is a particularly draconian example. This [policy] means that I cannot write a [web-based debugger] and post it on my web site for other developers to use [in] their own JavaScript. [Similarly, it] prevents the creation of JavaScript programs that crawl the Web, recursively following links from a given starting page."



"Because of the problems with [the same-origin policy], and with the theoretical underpinnings of [this class of security mechanisms], the developers at Netscape have created an entirely new security model. This new model is experimental in Navigator 3.0, and may be enabled by the end user through a procedure outlined later in this section. The new security model is theoretically much stronger, and should be a big advance for JavaScript security if it is enabled by default in Navigator 4.0."



"[Let's consider] the security problem we are worried about in the first place. For the most part, the problem is that private data may be sent across the Web by malicious JavaScript programs. The [SOP approach] patches this problem by preventing JavaScript programs from accessing private data. Unfortunately, this approach rules out non-malicious JavaScript [code that wants to use this data] without exporting it."



"Instead of preventing scripts from reading private data, a better approach would be to prevent them from exporting it, since this is what we are trying to [achieve] in the first place. If we could do this, then we could lift most of the [restrictions] that were detailed in the sections above."



"This is where the concept of data tainting comes in. The idea is that all JavaScript data values are given a flag. This flag indicates if the value is "tainted" (private) or not. [Tainted values will be prevented] from being exported to a server that does not already "own" it. [...] Whenever an attempt to export data violates the tainting rules, the user will be prompted with a dialog box asking them whether the export should be allowed. If they so choose, they can allow the export."



Of course, tainting would not have prevented malicious JavaScript from relaying the observations about the tainted data to parties unknown.